21.10.13

The Politics of Prudence

I just finished reading Constitutional Conservatism by Peter Berkowitz of the Hoover Institute and found it to be a fascinating read.

I am loathe to bring politics anywhere near the pulpit, as it has proven to be a dreadful distraction from the spiritual focus of the Church: proclaiming the Gospel of Jesus Christ from the whole of Scripture (nor do I think it appropriate, even it were not a distraction). That said, I cannot hide the fact that I love politics--the philosophy, the science, the art, the competition.

And one of my great passions in the history of the modern conservative movement. I love learning of its roots in great British parliamentarian, Edmund Burke, and its crucial role in the shaping of the American founding through figures like John Adams and Alexander Hamilton (for more on these figures, see Russell Kirk's The Conservative Mind). I am particular fascinated by the resurgence of conservatism in the aftermath of WWII, where fiscal libertarians (emphasize freedom and limited government), traditionalists (conservation of order, tradition, and virtue), and foreign policy hawks (those who sought to maintain these principles before aggressive foreign adversaries), gradually coalesced into what became the modern conservative movement.

Later, this movement was joined by the "Religious Right" which added grassroots heft to the intellectual weight of the traditionalists, as well as neo-conservatives (former liberal academics who became disillusioned with the modern trajectory of the Democratic Party). Berkowitz seems to fall pretty clear into this latter camp. Neo-conservatives tend to be more realistic and pragmatic in their approach to politics. Instead of trying to return government and society to its former glory days, they concede that America will never again accept "small government," but will abide by "limited government." Likewise, the sexual revolution will never be overturned, but its more harmful impulses can hopefully be channeled into more positive directions.

There has always been inherent frictions between these different groups. Libertarian emphases on freedom and creative destruction do not mesh well with traditionalist emphases on tradition and virtue. Neo-conservative concessions regarding government and culture tend to prove an open sore to libertarian and traditionalist alike. The emphasis on security measures and military power by hawks and neo-conservatives find a sharp objection from the libertarians. Over the decades, William F. Buckley of National Review became the dominant figure in channeling these healthy debates into a fundamental political course that united these streams upon common complex view of human nature (dignified and depraved) that likewise stood as the worldview behind America's founding. For a great debate between these groups, see Frank Meyer's What is Conservatism? and to see how these groups were all drawn together, see George Nash's The History of the Conservative Intellectual Movement Since 1945.

Berkowitz, in setting forth his vision of Constitutional Conservatism, traces many of the aforementioned periods and figures. He spends a chapter on the thought of Edmund Burke, a chapter on the Federalist-Anti-Federalist debates surrounding the Constitution, a chapter on the rise of modern conservatism through Kirk, Hayek, Friedman, Chambers, Buckley, and Meyer to the polticians, Goldwater and Reagan, and finally a chapter on the future.

Having read much from many of these figures, what I found particularly arresting was Berkowitz's continual theme of political moderation (as opposed to ideological) as a key component of conservatism. Conservatism came to the fore in the Western world alongside the reactionary utopianism of the French Revolution. Conservatism constantly sought to engage a real world, not an ideal one, and changes were sought with prudence, through compromise, and for incremental change.

This same political moderation infused the conservatism of the founding, tempered the debates of the modern movement, and was keenly expressed in the presidency of Ronald Reagan, who sought substantial, but not revolutionary, changes while in office. Throughout the history of conservatism, compromise has not generally been viewed as a departure from principle, but a prudent exercise of it in pursuit of incremental change and long-term gain.

Practical application to modern political (without engaging in the foray or the particulars): While the Tea Party (Republicans, Independents, and Democrats alike) has replenished the philosophical roots of conservatism in the present day by speaking more of the role of government in a representative democracy, it has not shown the political moderation of past generations of conservatism. America, unlike France, is an inherently moderate country. She desires changes in increments, not in revolutions, and punishes those who overreach. Conservatism has historically embraced this impulse.

Instead of speaking of "small government," it should indeed speak of "limited government." Entitlements will not go away, but they can certainly be reformed, and perhaps without severe political consequences if done with prudence. Abortion will not be outlawed anytime soon, but there is a public consensus regarding the heinous nature of partial-birth abortion. Why not pursue the elimination of what most consider infanticide rather than waste political capital on a Constitution amendment that will never pass? As Russell Kirk once said, "There is no such thing as permanent political losses, nor permanent political victories."

America may one day face her next "rendezvous with destiny," and that rendezvous must involve conviction and compromise in service of conviction if it is to prove successful.