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It is not as if any war is without controversy. Perhaps a third of our countrymen were English loyalists at the time of the Revolution. We seemed to stumble into the War of 1812 after a number of very partisan decisions (and scandals). Border skirmishes were used as an excuse to launch the Mexican War. A ship explosion of dubious origin presaged the Spanish-American War (presaging the Gulf of Tonkin incident in Vietnam less than a century later).
The Civil War was largely ignited by a firebrand minority of abolitionists in the North and a rebellious band of secessionists in the deep South. The bankers that were supposed to keep us out of the "Great War" were later accused of playing a role in our involvement. FDR was (rightly) accused on wanting to enter the even greater war against Hitler. In both Korea and Vietnam, many questioned why "American boys" were fighting wars that "Asian boys" should be fighting. And a Republican president couldn't go near an oil-producing state in either the early 90's or the early 2000's without the claim "blood for oil." (FYI, there was no economic/energy benefit to either war, with the exception that we preserved the oil fields of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the first one.)
Here, I propose, in brief, to defend three of our most controversial wars: Vietnam, OEF, and OIF.
Like the whitewashing of the Civil War in modern education, the Vietnam War has largely been twisted beyond recognition before the eyes of America's youth. They do not know that there was validity behind our action there, the majority of the American public supported the war for much of its duration, and we had a very realistic shot at winning the war.
There are legitimate doubts accompanying the inception of the Vietnam War. Our initial involvement seemed to have more to do with French colonialism than Soviet communism. In addition, the incident that escalated our involvement in the Gulf of Tonkin was likely manufactured. That said, the "domino theory" behind our involvement was largely sound. The theory--that the fall of one state to Soviet communism would lead to another--is largely ridiculed today as anti-communist paranoia. But we were right to be paranoid. Regions did fall like dominoes to Soviet communism, including regions close to home. By the time Reagan came to office, the shadow of the sphere of Soviet influence had descended over much of the world.
That said, whether Vietnam was the right place to stop the dominoes from falling is questionable. What is beyond question is that the war was largely winnable, except for the incompetent strategy of some of our elected leaders and misguided tactics of some of our military leaders. In fact, the Tet Offensive, cited by Grandpa Cronkite as his rationale for labeling Vietnam a "failed war," was in fact a devastating blow to the Vietcong that could have presaged American victory. As this was a proto-terrorist war as well, a counter-insurgency strategy that employed a "winning the hearts and minds approach" would've gone a long way at uniting the South Vietnamese against the North.
Even after LBJ tried his best to let the war wind down into a depressing defeat, Nixon came in, revived American support and almost won the war. He withdrew American troops, but battered the North into oblivion from the air, which greatly reduced their ability against the South. It was only when Watergate squandered all of Nixon's political capital that the war was largely lost.
There was more unanimity on the war in Afghanistan. It was controversial to the extent that the U.S. attacked a country that had not first attacked the U.S. But it was not controversial in accordance with post-9/11 war doctrine, which declared that any states that harbor terrorists who pose a clear and present danger to the U.S are subject to the full extent of U.S. war power. Much of the world agreed with this principle of warfare, and for the first time in its history, NATO invoked the clause of its treaty that an attack of one member was an attack on all and joined the U.S. for the fight in Afghanistan.
That same principle of war doctrine became part of the justification for war in Iraq. After 9/11, the calculus of U.S. foreign policy changed dramatic. We learned that non-state-based actors could project devastating destructive power upon the U.S. From that points on, any country the might equip terrorists groups with the resources and destructive power that could result in a catastrophe in the U.S. was subject to attack. There was no more clear and present danger in this regard than Iraq. In many ways, they were the most substantial supporter of terrorism. For example, Iraq did more to fund the terrorist actions of Hamas than any other nation.
At the same time, Iraq was clearly more 1) aggressive and 2) lethal than any other country. Of the main threats of the time--Iraq, Iran, and North Korea (Syria and Libya were cowed into submission by our new war doctrine)--only one country had attacked other countries in recent history (against Iran and later, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) and only one had used WMD (against Iran and against the Kurds): Iraq.
In fact, even prior to our new war posture after 9/11, Iraq was deemed such a threat to international security that it was bound to certain conditions by the U.N., including the unfettered inspections of its WMD facilities. The U.N. specifically mandated military action against Iraq if those inspections were in any way prevented or manipulated. This danger was clearly recognized by the international community before 9/11. President Clinton only bombed Iraq when it was in violation of these conditions, but he clearly had warrant invade Iraq and decapitate the Hussein regime.
When put in the context of a post-9/11 world, where terrorists could wreak havoc upon our country, a nation with Iraq's track record and support of terrorism made them a threat the world could not abide. It is a shame that the indictment was not more unanimous against Iraq, but many countries had economic ties to Iraq that they didn't want to sever. Remember, however, that the U.S. led a "coalition of the willing," comprising several dozen nations, that saw the justice in that cause.
It is a shame that after not discovering WMD, President Bush defended the war on humanitarian grounds. The American people saw through this thin rationale. If we were in Iraq for humanitarian reasons, what about the Sudanese genocide, which was much more blatant?
In reality, the case for war in Iraq was not built upon their actual supply of WMDs, but of the potential possession of WMDs. After the first Gulf War, the U.N. forbid them from leaving this as an unknown quantity due to the threat they posed to the world. After 9/11, and with Iraq's connections with terrorism, the threat they posed was unacceptable.
These opinions, of course, are just that. But as our wars in the Middle East draw to a close (for at least a few
years), may the discussions that surrounded them continue!
