I never realized how close our country was to losing the battle at Gettysburg, and consequently, the Civil War.
Perhaps that is because I never finished reading Shelby Foote's acclaimed and monstrous series on the Civil War. I couldn't keep reading. I find the whole conflict unbelievably depressing.
I learned soon after high school that the conflict was not nearly as clear-cut from a moral vantage point as I was led to believe. Slavery played role in the lead-up to the conflict, but not the decisive role. Some of the evidence for this contention:
-The majority of the country, including the North, was willing to tolerate slavery. This included Abraham Lincoln. He was perfectly content to seek a gradual extinction of slavery through compromise and economic incentives (paying for freedom, etc). What he, and the North, would not abide was the dissolution of the United States.
-The Emancipation Proclamation, while rooted in the morality of Lincoln and our founding ideals, was also the result of a pragmatic pursuit of undermining the free labor which helped support the Confederate cause and excite the abolitionist base of the North. It also only applied to the Southern states, not the Northern border states that still allowed slavery.
-There were many in the South who did not support slavery, including a number of Southern leaders. If one asked the average Confederate why they were fighting, they would respond "Because they are down here." They were against the federal government being mobilized against their states and homes and against a Northern minority's moral imposition.
-If the Union had lost the battle at Gettysburg. Not only would it have been a disastrous military defeat, leading to the possible occupation of DC, it would have been a disastrous political defeat. New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania were all turning against the war and another loss would most definitely prompt many of them to demand a suing for peace terms and a compromise on slavery. Even if Lincoln tried to stand against this rising political tide, he would have likely lost to the Democratic candidate for president in 1864, Gen. George McClellan, who would have likewise sued for peace and compromised on slavery (most Northern Democrats were against the Emancipation Proclamation).
As it was, the fiery speech planned by the Democratic Governor of New York for July 4th, denouncing the continuation of the war, would need to be cancelled due to the events of July 1st-3rd in Gettysburg. Here's how the Confederacy almost won the battle and the war:
-Gen. Robert E. Lee invaded the North, not do achieve a decisive military victory, but to so thoroughly demoralize a war-weary Union that they were forced to sue for peace and end the war. He initially wanted to avoid a general engagement. If he had managed to avoid such an engagement, he would have likely won the war. (He knew what was happening in NY, NJ, and PA.)
-If an engagement did come with Union troops, he would capitalize on their frantic efforts to catch up with him and turn his whole army against each over-extended Union corps as it engaged him. But his trap was sprung early by over-zealous Union corps commanders, who didn't give him time to consolidate his forces. Meanwhile, his cavalry under Jeb Stuart was nowhere to be found and his on-ground intelligence was poor enough that he didn't realize how quickly the whole Union army was to catching him. Instead, the Union and Confederacy were probably throwing in new corps and brigades at about the same pace. If the Confederate army was given time to consolidate and/or the Union army had been slower to consolidate, Lee's strategy would've likely won the war.
-The battle itself was not a contest between Lee and his Union counterpart, Gen. George Mead. This was due to Lee's leadership philosophy (present the overall strategy and let the corps commanders guide the tactics) and Meade's inexperience (three days in overall command prior to the battle) and lack of imagination (always reactive, never proactive). Instead, the battle came down to the leadership of corps and brigade commanders. And perhaps for the first time in the war, the Confederacy was outmatched. They sorely missed the innovative and aggressive tactics of Gen. "Stonewall" Jackson and were baffled by the hilly, gated terrain of Pennsylvania. If the mid-level tier of Confederate leaders was still infused with Jackson's audacity or was more comfortable with the terrain, they would have likely brought about a Confederate victory.
-There were a number of moments when the Confederate army's distance from victory could be measured in yards and minutes, and most of these yards and minutes centered around Cemetery Hill--the Union stronghold. Yet, at each of these moments, an unforeseen and incredible obstacle was thrown in the way. Many an unknown Union one-star or Colonel would jump from his horse and join his men in fights to the death. Reinforcements would arrive for the Union at just the moment when the lines were being overrun and were sometimes able to throw back vastly superior forces in the confusion. At other points, Confederate leaders stopped their offensive just short of total victory, thinking that they could mop up later in the battle. Finally, at several key points, the Confederate force would have prevailed, but for the delay or cowardice of another leader/unit that was supposed to guard their flank and press the attack. If, at any of these points, certain mid-level Union leaders showed less courage, reinforcements arrived five minutes later, or the full array of Confederate forces assigned to an attack were at the ready, the Confederacy would have prevailed.
But after three days of battle, Gen. Pickett's doomed charge was dashed against the rocks of a matured and desperate Union army and the Union scored its first substantial military victory of the war (quickly followed by Vicksburg in the west). The Confederate army was forced back across the Potomac River, anti-war politicians in the North cancelled their speeches, and the Union army was ready to press home their victory (but for the dawdling of Meade and his array of mostly moderate Democratic generals). The whole complexion of the war--militarily and politically--was decisively changed in time for the celebration of America's independence.
Yet, at such a great cost. Approximately one-third of both the Northern and Southern armies were lost to death, injury, or capture. Some companies were reduced to a mere handful of soldiers, all of their comrades-in-arms now lost to them. The death toll that day exceeded 9/11, Pearl Harbor, and D-Day. The second day of battle alone was nearly equivalent to the horrendous battle of Antietam a year before. Perhaps the most horrific dimension of the retreat for Confederate soldiers, aside from the devastating affect on morale, was the sounds coming from the medical wagons that passed them by. One voice was heard crying out "I am dying! What will become of my poor wife and children?" Thousands of widows would be asking that same question in the weeks to come.
The Civil War was not fundamentally fought over the issue of slavery, but over whether a state had the right to secede from the Union. Were the rights of the state ultimate over the rights of the individual it sought to oppress or the rights of the nation that was Constitutionally-bound? The state, the great bulwark of federalism against the oppressive tendencies of a national government, was used to bludgeon the individual and hold the nation over the precipice of anarchy. After that time (America's "second founding," according to historian Mark Noll) the greatest line of defense in service of Constitutional freedoms was largely lost due to its abuse.
Lincoln came to speak of the Civil War in spiritual and apocalyptic terms. While the war was fundamentally about preserving the Union, for Lincoln, it was also God's judgment upon such an unjustifiably moral evil as slavery. While reading into God's providence is a futile endeavor, the great moral scourge of slavery was removed from history's great island of freedom through the great moral scourge of self-inflicted war. To belittle the horror of either scourge is to belittle the great blood-letting through brought our country back together again.
